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THE "INDIVIDUAL" EXEMPTION FROM THE
ILLINOIS PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX
INTRODUCTION

Under pre-1971 Illinois law an ad valorem personal property
tax was levied against all personal property located within the
state.1 On November 3, 1970, the Illinois electorate voted on
an amendment to the 1870 Illinois Constitution, which would
limit the broad application of the tax if approved. The referendum stated that "the taxation of personal property by valuation
'2
is prohibited as to individuals.
The phrase "as to individuals" seemed straightforward and
each voter undoubtedly understood that he was determining
whether or not he would continue to incur personal property
taxes by casting his ballot. It was less likely, however, that the
voter possessed an understanding of the amendment's scope and
effect beyond an expectation of his personal relief from the burden of the tax.3 The local officials responsible for collecting the
tax faced a more formidable task in their interpretation of the
phrase in the wake of overwhelming voter approval of the amendment.4 They were charged with the duty to determine who were
"individuals" exempt from taxation, and who were "non-individuals" still liable for the tax. The distinction between these
classes was not readily apparent, and the collectors understandably sought outside assistance. As a result, the language of the
amendment to the 1870 Constitution was the subject of an Attorch. 120, § 499 (1971):
The property named in this section shall be assessed and taxed
except so much thereof as may be, in this act, exempted:
First: All real and personal property in this state.
Second: All moneys, credits, bonds or stocks and other invest1. ILL. REV. STAT.

ments, the shares of stock of incorporated companies and associations, and all other personal property . . .used, held, owned or controlled by persons residing in this state ....
2. ILL. CONST. art. IX-A (1870) (emphasis in the original). Al-

though the amendment was voted on in November, 1970, it was not to
take effect until January 1, 1971, some six months before the new, 1970
Constitution was to become law. See also S.J. RES. 30, Ill. S. Jour., 76th
Gen. Assem., 1969 Sess., vol. II at 3476.
3. See, e.g., the statement of Mr. Strunck during the constitutional
debates to the effect that much confusion existed about the meaning of
the phrase "as to individuals" in the referendum, but that the "voter is
entitled to vote as he sees fit on his interpretation of the word 'individual.'" Mr. Strunck did not direct himself to the question of how the
voter should see fit to decide the interpretation, since the delegates were
themselves unable to agree.

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS,

SIXTH

ILL. CONSTI-

Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 2055 (1969-70)
[hereinafter cited as Verbatim Transcripts].
4. The amendment passed by a majority of in excess of 7 to 1. Chicago Tribune, November 5, 1970, § 1, at 14, col. 3.
TUTIONAL CONVENTION,
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ney General's Opinion, 5 an opinion by the 'Cook County State's
Attorney,6 a further clarification by the General Assembly,7 and
numerous lawsuits.
To confuse matters further, the language of the amendment
proved to be of great concern to the delegates of the 1970 Constitutional Convention, who had convened to draft a new Illinois
Constitution prior to the referendum vote. This concern was felt
and expressed by those delegates who were closely concerned
with the proposed changes in the personal property taxation section of the new Revenue Article." Throughout the constitutional
debates the delegates were confronted with uncertainty both as
to the eventual outcome of the referendum vote 9 and as to the
definition of the word "individual."' 10 If the amendment passed,
they most certainly did not want the new constitution to reimpose the personal property tax on "individuals." To do so would
place the Revenue Article of the 1970 Constitution in jeopardy
Moreover, if the delegates
of not gaining voter approval."
5. ILL. ATT. GEN. OP. S-260, January 22, 1971.
6. COOK CTY. ST.'S ATT'Y OP. No. 1340, December 28, 1970.
7. S.J. REs. 67, Il. S. Jour., 76th Gen. Assem., 1970 Sess., vol. II at
4405.

8.

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,

Comm. Proposals, vol. VII at 2129-42, 2170-83 (1969-70) [hereinafter
cited as Comm. Proposals].
9. The majority of the delegates felt that the referendum would be
voted into law. However, due to the remote possibility that it might
not be, attempts were made throughout the convention to insert language
which would remain viable regardless of the outcome of the November
3rd referendum vote. See, e.g., Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 2068
(statement of Mr. Tomei); id., vol. V at 3888 (statement of Mr.
McCracken). See also the statement of Mr. Scott during the convention:
[I]f the people [vote for the amendment to the 1870 Constitution]
on November 3, and then if they come on December 8 or in January
to vote for our proposal and it puts that tax back on them, do you
think they are going to vote for [the 1970 Constitution]? No, they
are not.
Id., vol. III at 2040.
Surprisingly, as originally proposed by the drafting committee, the
language of section 4.2 would have nullified the results of the referendum
vote to add the amendment to the 1870 Constitution. See Comm. Proposals, vol. VII at 2137. But see id. at 2138 (dissent by delegate Cicero),
which pointed out the danger of withdrawing what had been approved
by the Illinois voters.
10. "[T] here is a proposition on the ballot this fall. It is one of those
weird and wonderful products of the General Assembly that nobody is
quite sure what it means." Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 2039 (statement of Mr. Elward). "[T]he amendment in November is clouded with
so much uncertainty as to its application that we will be years, we fear,
trying to figure out what it really means." Id. at 2038 (statement of
Mr. S. Johnson).
The obstacle facing the delegates, therefore, was either determining
to whom the phrase "as to individuals" referred, or writing the section
to encompass whatever definition emerged from an eventual judicial interpretation. The delegates were in agreement that a judicial definition
was inevitable, but pragmatically realized that it would not occur before
the close of the convention. Id. at 1910-11 (statements of Mr. Scott and
Mr. Karns).
11. See, e.g., the statement of Mr. S. Johnson during the constitutional
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inserted language exempting "individuals" from the tax, and the
referendum was later defeated, the 1970 Constitution would serve
to decrease local tax revenues and again serve to frustrate the
voters' desires.
These problems were solved by the new Revenue Article
which provided that "[a] ny ad valorem personal property tax
abolished on or before the effective date of [the 1970] Constitution shall not be reinstated. ' 12 This language insured that the
result of the referendum vote would be retained under the new
constitution. 13 It also relieved the delegates from making a
determination of precisely to whom the phrase "as to individuals"4
referred. This determination would have to await the courts.'
Another difficult problem confronting the delegates was a
suggestion made by certain members of the revenue committee
to abolish all personal property taxes and not simply those levied
upon "individuals."' 5 It was widely recognized that the ad
valorem personal property tax was unfair, unworkable, and
impossible to administer equitably. 10 Despite these evils, a
convention:
[I]f the voters believe that the language of the [1970) constitution
is so vague as to have invalidated [the 1870 constitutional amendment], we will be in deep trouble as far as getting the revenue
article passed.
Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 2038. See also id. -at 2039, 2040, and

2153.

12. ILL. CONST. art. 9, § 5(b) (1970).
13. "[T]he first sentence of our amendment takes into account [the
amendment to article IX of the 1870 Constitution] and puts our stamp
of approval on [it]." Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 2038 (statement
of Mr. S. Johnson). The 1970 Constitution was to take effect on July
1, 1971. The amendment to the 1870 Constitution, if approved, would
take effect on January 1, 1971. Therefore since the personal property
tax would be abolished "as to individuals'; before the effective date of
the 1970 Constitution, it could not later be reinstated on "individuals"
as a class.
14. See note 10 supra.
15. See Comm. Proposals, vol. VII at 2133-37. This desire to eliminate the personal property tax was originally opposed 'by many of the
committee drafting the new Revenue Article. This opposition resulted in
the provision for the replacement revenue:
Several members of this Committee believe that the new constitution should entirely prohibit the ad valorem taxation of personal
property. Other members of the Committee believe that the loss
of all personal property tax revenue would create such a serious
problem for local government that it is out of the question to mandate exemption of all personal property.
Id. at 2134-35.
16. "[T]he experts . . . do not criticize the philosophy that personal
property should not be taxed, but rather criticize the administration of
the tax . . . ." Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 1909 (statement of Mr.
Karns). See also id. at 1912 (concerning the amounts and percentages
actually collected from the personal property tax). "[T]he personal
property tax in Illinois-as elsewhere-is a scandal." Simeon E. Leland,
MEMORANDUM ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE PROPERTY TAX, Report of Governor's Revenue Study Committee 1968-69, 175 (1969). "Although it has
been estimated that from one-half to two-thirds of all property in the
state is in the form of personal property of various kinds, only 20 per-
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majority of the committee knew that the State of Illinois could
not afford to eliminate the tax unless the legislature replaced
the revenue which would be lost to local governments. 7 In
order to solve these problems, the delegates reached a compromise.
The compromise language contained in section 5 (c) of Article
IX of the new constitution provides that all personal property
taxes are to be abolished by January 1, 1979, and that replacement taxes must be imposed which fall solely on those classes
relieved of paying -personal property taxes after January 2,
1971.18 This provision raises the question of whether an exploration of who comprises the class of "individuals" is necessary.
Since it is apparent that the tax will be completely eliminated
in 1979, it would seem that all classes will be relieved of the
personal property tax in that year.
The elimination of the tax, however, may never occur, and
the personal property tax could remain in Illinois indefinitely.
This argument has been made by a delegate to the 1970 Constitutional Convention, who believes that section 5 (c) of Article IX
of the 1970 Constitution creates a mandate to the General
Assembly rather than a limitation.1 9 If the section is a mancent of property tax revenue is produced by personal property taxes
.... "
BRADEN & COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION:
AN ANNOTATED
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 416 (1969). "[The personal property tax is]
a nefarious, vicious, unenforceable tax.... ".Verbatim Transcripts, vol.
V at 3834 (statement of Mr. Connor).
17. There was little debate on simply ending the personal property
tax altogether unless the resulting loss of revenue could be made up in
some other way. It was stated during the debates that 20 percent of
state revenue was derived from the personal property tax, but that some

local districts received as much as 50 percent of its revenue from the

tax. Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 1908 (statement of Mr. Karns).
Some of these local districts had up to 80 percent of its tax base in the
form of personal property. Id., vol. V at 3829 (statement of Mr. Garrison).
The personal property tax, like the real property tax, is a strictly
local revenue source. The delegates, therefore, did not want to see the
local taxing districts lose the personal property tax revenue, and thereby
lose the control over the school system which inevitably accompanies
fiscal control.
18. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 5(c) (1970):
On or before January 1, 1979, the General Assembly by law shall
abolish all ad valorem personal property taxes and concurrently
therewith and thereafter shall replace all revenues lost by units of
local government and school districts as a result of the abolition of
ad valorem personal property taxes subsequent to January 2, 1971.
Such revenue shall be replaced by imposing statewide taxes, other
than ad valorem taxes on real estate, solely on those classes relieved
of the burden of paying ad valorem personal property taxes because
of the abolition of such taxes subsequent to January 2, 1971 ...
19. This distinction is vital. A mandate to the General Assembly is
generally not enforceable in a court of law. A limitation, however, as
the name implies, is a restriction on the legislative power and is, therefore, legally enforceable. The position that merely a mandate was created is argued in Kamin, Constitutional Abolition of Ad Valorem Personal Property Taxes: A Looking-Glass Book, 60 ILL. B.J. 432. Corn-
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date, the legislature will have no affirmative duty to eliminate
the tax and cannot be forced to do so in a court of law. In
this case, the tax will remain in force and only those "individuals" relieved of the tax due to the amendment to the 1870 Constitution will remain exempt from personal property taxation.
A determination, then, of whom comprises the class of "individuals" will be of continuing relevance and importance.
There is of course the possibility that the legislature will
either follow the constitutional mandate or treat the section as
if it were a limitation, and thereby abolish the ad valorem personal property tax in its entirety. In such a case the definition of
who is in the class of "individuals" will remain crucial because
of the -requirement for the replacement revenue.20 Since the
replacement tax can be imposed "solely on those classes relieved
of the burden of paying ad valorem personal property taxes because of the abolition of such taxes subsequent to January 2,
1971, ' 1 "individuals" will not be liable for replacement taxes
because their burden of personal property taxation was eliminated on January 1, 1971.22
Given the concern expressed over the meaning of the word
"individuals" in the constitutional convention, 23 and the obvious
tax ramifications depending upon whether an entity was an
"individual," it is clear why there has been litigation on the
issue. 24 The judicial definition of the phrase has proven to be
elusive, however, and the question has been before the Illinois
Supreme Court on three separate occasions. Even the most
recent decision 25. leaves the serious question of whether the
legislature's intent has been frustrated.
The court's greatest difficulty has centered around the trust
relationship and determining the circumstances under which perpare the language of Mr. Whalen, Verbatim Transcripts, vol. V at 3758
with his language, id. at 3762 and Mr. Davis' statement in response to a
question by Mr. Thompson, id. at 3831 and Vice President Lyons' statement, id., vol. III at 2060 and Mr. Garrison's statement, id. at 2140.
20. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 5(c) (1970). See note 18 supra. While
the decision of the legislature to abolish the personal property tax is generally deemed a mandate (see note 19 supra), it has been argued that
if the General Assembly chooses to follow the mandate and abolishes
the personal property tax, it will then be faced with a limitation. This
judicially enforceable requirement would force the legislature to provide
replacement revenue for all revenue lost by reason of the abolition of
the personal property tax. Kamin, Constitutional Abolition of Ad
Valorem Personal Property Taxes: A Looking-Glass Book, 60 ILL. B.J.
432.
21. ILL. CONsT. art. IX, § 5(c) (1970). See note 18 supra.
22. See note 2 supra.
23. Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 1910-11 (statements of Mr. Scott
and Mr. Karns).
24. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 Ill. 2d 137, 273 N.E.2d
592 (1971), rev'd sub nom., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U.S. 356 (1973).
25. Hanley v. Kusper, 61 Ill. 2d 452, 337 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
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sonal property held in trust is exempt from taxation. When the
electorate voted on the amendment to the 1870 Constitution they
voted to relieve themselves from the tax in their personal
capacity. A vast majority of them, however, had never acted
as an executor of a decedent's estate, or as a trustee or custodian
of a minor's or incompetent's trust. While prior to the amendment's passage such a trustee would have been liable for the personal property tax, a question of whether he remained so liable
arose after passage.
Although the court has easily defined "individual" as an
ordinary person owning non-business, non-income producing
property, thereby excluding corporations from the personal
property tax, a large gray area remains. In this area is the trust,
wherein either a corporate or non-corporate trustee holds personal property for an "individual" beneficiary.
Through an examination of recent cases, it will be determined whether the courts have succeeded in reaching logically
supported conclusions with respect to the issues posed by the
use of the word "individual" in the amendment. Prior to assessing the outcome, however, the legislative history must be examined to determine if the courts have carried out the legislative
intent.
LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS AT DEFINITION

The phrase "as to individuals" or the word "individuals" is
neither used nor defined in the Revenue Article of the 1870 Constitution, except in the amendment itself. 26 Even the provisions
of the Revenue Act of 1939, which implement the tax provided
for in the revenue article, do not employ the word. 27 Without
prior usage and interpretation upon which to rely, the ambiguities in the phrase "as to individuals" require an examination of
28
legislative intent.
Several purposes existed for adding the amendment to the
1870 Constitution. 29 The personal property tax was inequi26. ILL. CONST. art. IX (1870).

See Brief for Corporate Respondents,

M. Weil & Sons at 7-8, Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
U.S. 356 (1973).

27. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 482 et seq. (1973).
28. Bergeson v. Mullinix, 399 Il. 470, 78 N.E.2d 297 (1948). Illinois
courts have held that statutory and constitutional construction are essentially the same. Am. Aberdeen-Angus Breeders' Assn. v. Fullerton, 325
Ill. 323, 328, 156 N.E. 314, 316 (1927); People ex rel. Mooney v. Hutchinson, 172 Ill. 486, 497, 50 N.E. 599, 601 (1898). If the construction of statutes and constitutions is different, less technical rules are applied to constitutional construction. Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 78, 94, 126 N.E.2d
701, 710 (1955). Therefore, concepts from both statutory and constitutional construction will be utilized in this discussion.
29. "The purpose and subject matter of a statute necessarily determine or control the meaning of the words used in it." CRAWFORD, THE
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 186 (1940).
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table, 30 and it was widely recognized that all personal property
tax returns omitted or understated the value of property.
Rarely, if ever, were these inaccuracies prosecuted. 31 Furthermore, the legislature thought that the public's displeasure over
the newly enacted state income tax would be subdued somewhat
by abolishing the personal property tax.
A purpose also existed for restricting the relief solely to
"individuals. '' 32 The legislature was concerned about the revenue which would be lost if the personal property tax was totally
abolished. 33 Corporations had historically paid between sixty
and eighty percent of the personal property tax, 34 and the elimination of that revenue, even with the income tax, would have
been fiscally irresponsible.
An examination of the purposes of the amendment, therefore, yields only two broad generalizations. The tax was not
abolished as to corporations,33 and the tax was abolished for an
ordinary person owning non-business property. Obviously
many forms of ownership do not fit into these classifications, but
the amendment's purpose does not furnish any further indication
of legislative intent.
Although it would seem reasonable to use judicial interpretations of the word "individual" to resolve questions left unanswered by the legislative history,3 6 no pre-1971 cases in Illinois
had adequately defined the phrase. While cases in other jurisdictions had dealt with the word "individual," there were no
37
authoritative interpretations.
30. See note 16 supra.
31. Comm. Proposals,vol. VII at 2141 (dissent of delegate Meek).
32. When originally introduced upon the floor of the legislature, the
amendment would have eliminated all personal property taxes. This explains the use of italics for the phrase "as to individuals." See note 42
infra.
33. See note 17 supra.
34. Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 1912 (statement of Mr. Scott).
Ten corporations paid 50 percent of the personal property tax, while one
alone, Illinois Bell, paid 10 percent of the tax. Id. vol. III at 2052 (statement of Mr. Garrison).
35. Despite numerous judicial interpretations of the word "individual" which included corporations (see note 37 infra), a legislative intent
to exclude them from the tax relief is evident from the amendment.
36. The explanation, which was prepared by the legislature and
which accompanied the text of the amendment on the ballot, stated that
the amendment "would not affect the [personal property] tax levied
against corporations and other entities not considered in law to be individuals... ." Ill. S. Jour., 76th Gen. Assem., 1970 Sess. at 4203 (emphasis added).
37. Lupia's Estate v. Marcelle, 214 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1954) (a federal
statute exempted "individuals" who died in World War I from income
taxation in the year of death; a serviceman's share of partnership proceeds earned between the time of his death and the end of the year were
held to have been earned by an "individual," and were not, therefore,
taxed); Rusk v. Comm'r, 53 F.2d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1931) ("[w]e see
no reason why the word 'individual' . . . should not be construed to refer

to the executors as well as the decedent; for, while they are acting in
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In order to answer the growing problem caused by the lack
of any acceptable definition of the phrase "as to individuals,"
the Senate adopted a resolution with which the House of Representatives concurred. The resolution stated "that by the use
of the phrase 'as to individuals', this General Assembly intended
... By limiting the class of
to mean a natural person.
"individuals" to "natural persons," the legislature succeeded in
adding another factor to the issue. While the General Assembly
probably thought that its intent was made more clear by the
resolution, the courts have struggled equally as hard with the
"38

phrase "natural persons.

3 9

THE JUDICIAL DEFINITION OF "INDIVIDUAL"

The constitutionality of the amendment to the 1870 Constitution was tested shortly after it was approved. Lake Shore Auto
Parts Co. brought a class action on behalf of all corporations
40
and "non-individuals" subject to personal property taxation,
and alleged that the amendment violated the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution. Lake Shore felt, that
Illinois was discriminating against the corporate form of business
ownership by limiting the personal property tax relief to "individuals." The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs'
allegations and accordingly held the amendment to be unconstitutional.

41

their official capacity as executors, they are nevertheless individuals.
* ."); In re Button Co., 137 F. 668, 672 (D. Del. 1904) ("'individual'
);
[is] equivalent to 'person,' and as such include[s] a corporation .
Nat'l Acct'g Co. v. Dorman, 11 F. Supp. 872, 873 (E.D. Ky. 1935) ("[tlhe
word 'individual' . . . is broad enough to embrace not only single natural
persons, but partnerships and corporations as well, unless the context
of the statute repels this broader meaning."); Nelson v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 259 Cal. App. 2d 248, 250, 66 Cal. Rptr. 115, 118 (1968)
("the word 'individual' is broad enough to embrace corporations and
partnerships, and ... where the context does not indicate otherwise, the
word includes corporations, partnerships and associations. . . ."); Forrester v. Trust Co., 15 S.E.2d 559 (Ct. of App., Ga. 1941) ("[i]t is clear
that fiduciaries and individuals are governed in effect alike by the provisions relating to individuals .... "). But see Hadden v. South Carolina
Tax Comm., 190 S.E. 249 (Sup. Ct. S.C. 1973) (legislative intent expressly
showed a desire to eliminate fiduciaries, partnerships, and corporations
from the term "individual"); Primm v. Fort, 23 Tex. Cv. A. 605, 57 S.W.
972 (1900).
38. S.J. RES. 67, Ill. S. Jour., 76th Gen. Assem., 1970 Sess., vol. II at
4405 (1970) (emphasis added). This resolution was adopted on May 19,
1970.
39. Even the delegates to the convention realized that defining "individuals" as "natural persons" would not solve the problem. During the
convention Mrs. Leahy stated that "even the resolution ... didn't clear
up all the ambiguity. . . ." Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 2055.
40. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 Ill. 2d 137, 273 N.E.2d
592 (1971), rev'd sub nom., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U.S. 356 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as Lake Shore I].
41. Id. at 151, 273 N.E.2d at 599.
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision, and
reinstated the constitutional amendment 42 which abolished personal property taxes "as to individuals. ' 43 Although arriving
at different results, the major holding 44 of both courts on the
issue of equal protection suffers from serious defects. 45 In both
Lake Shore I and Lehnhausen, Lake Shore Co. alleged invidious
state discrimination against its class of "non-individuals" and in
favor of the class of "individuals" exempted from the personal
property tax by the amendment to the 1870 Constitution. Since
the essence of equal protection is that a governmental classification must be reasonable, 46 it would seem mandatory for a sound
42. The usual effect when a tax is held unconstitutional is to enjoin
the collector from further collections. In Lake Shore I, however, the Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the personal property tax on all classes,
rather than eliminating collections altogether. Lake Shore Co. contended
before the United States Supreme Court that this action deprived it of
its victory. Lake Shore Co., therefore, urged the Court to affirm the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, but in so doing to eliminate the
tax as to all classes liable for it.
43. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973)
[hereinafter referred to as Lehnhausen].
44. A secondary issue presented to and rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court raised the difficulties and complexities which the legislature
created by its reference to "individuals." The non-corporate plaintiffs
established that two personal property tax forms were then used in Illinois for non-corporate taxpayers. One was filed by
'individuals, partnerships, and unincorporated associations owning or
controlling personal property used in agriculture, and all individuals
owning or controlling any personal property which is not owned or
used in connection with any business (other than agriculture) * * *'
The other was filed by " 'proprietorships, partnerships and unincorporated associates engaged in business (other than agriculture) * * *.'"
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 Ill. 2d 137, 146-47, 273 N.E.2d
592, 597 (1971).
The plaintiffs argued that the legislature had intended a technical
meaning of the phrase "as to individuals" by placing it in italics, and
had desired that all those persons or organizations required to fill out
the first of the two forms be exempted from the personal property tax.
Had this argument been successful, the personal property tax would have
been abolished only as to "natural persons owning personal property not
used in business." Id. at 147, 273 N.E.2d at 597. Any natural person
owning property for a business purpose would remain liable for the tax.
The court rejected this contention, however, since the italicization
was caused by the addition of the phrase "as to individuals" after the
introduction of the original amendment on the floor of the legislature.
As originally proposed, the personal property tax would have been totally abolished, so the italicization emphasized that the amendment restricted relief solely "as to individuals."
45. In Lake Shore I the Illinois Supreme Court found the amendment
to the 1870 Constitution in contravention of the equal protection clause,
relying upon Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928).
In this case the United States Supreme Court held that a gross receipts
tax, which was levied upon taxicabs owned by corporations, but not
those owned by individuals, was unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds.
Unable to distinguish Quaker City from the facts before them, the
Court in Lehnhausen held that Quaker City was "only a relic of a bygone
era," Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 365 (1973),
and held that "making corporations and like entities liable for ad valorem taxes on personal property but not individuals does not transcend
the requirements of equal protection." Id. at 364.

46. "[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
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holding that both classes be identified specifically. The Illinois
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, however,
did not extend their opinions to such a determination.
The most specific statement by the Illinois Supreme Court
was that "ad valorem taxation of personal property owned by
a natural person . . . is prohibited. '4 7 Unfortunately, the term
"natural person," as used in the Senate Resolution, raised as
many ambiguities as did the term "individuals. ' 48 Therefore,
the Lake Shore I decision added nothing to previously announced
legislative intent, and, like the legislative definition, it was insufficient to satisfy the reasonableness test.
While the language of the Supreme Court indicated that the
Court would reverse based on its own construction of the word
"individual, ' 49 the opinion abounds in broad generalizations °
and fails to provide sufficient support to satisfy the equal protection test.5 1 So, although the amendment to the 1870 Constitution was held constitutional by the Supreme Court, both the
United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
47. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 Ill. 2d 137, 148, 273
N.E.2d 592, 597 (1971).
48. See notes 38, 39, and accompanying text supra.
49. The Supreme Court stated in its opinion that the Illinois Supreme
Court construed personal property taxes on individuals to mean "'ad
valorem taxation of personal property owned by a natural person .... '
As so construed, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the tax violated
Lehnthe Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."

hausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 358 (1973)

(emphasis

added).
The Court proceeded no further in its interpretation of the word "individual," and in fact may have been prevented from doing so. In the
amicus curiae brief of Richard B. Ogilvie, then Governor of Illinois, it
was contended that the Supreme Court was bound by the Illinois Supreme Court's determination of the word "individual" in Lake Shore I.
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and Madden v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) were cited as support for this
contention. Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
The brief of other amici curiae, however, proceeded on the assumption
that the U.S. Supreme Court was free to determine the definition of "individual," as used in article IX of the 1870 Constitution. Amici Curiae
Brief of the Corporate Fiduciaries Assoc. of Ill. at 4, id.
50. "When it comes to taxes on corporations and taxes on individuals,
great leeway is permissible so far as equal protection is concerned."
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 360 (1973).
51. The Court did not attempt a definition and concluded that "making corporations and like entities liable for ad valorem taxes on personal
property but not individuals does not transcend the requirements of
equal protection." Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S.
356, 364 (1973). The failure of the United States Supreme Court to undertake the necessary definition is more excusable than is the failure of
the Illinois court. The U.S. Supreme Court found the amendment constitutional, and could justify its holding on Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic,
220 U.S. 61 (1911), which held that classifications are generally presumed

reasonable.
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failed to define who the "individuals" were that enjoyed the
relief from the personal property tax.
Following reversal by the United States Supreme Court, the
consolidated actions were remanded to the state court in order
to interpret the word "individuals" in light of the prior two
opinions. The parties were invited to submit memoranda setting forth their interpretations of "individuals," and the state
supreme court issued its supplemental opinion based upon those
briefs. 2 Although this opinion did not provide an actual
definition of the word "individual" beyond that expressed in
Lake Shore I, it did mention actual taxable entities for the first
time. Thus, the court held that partnerships, limited partnerships, joint ventures, professional associations, and professional
5 3
service corporations were still subject to taxation.
The most surprising development in the opinion was the
court's mention of the trust relationship, and the most startling
statement was that "[t]rustees and other fiduciaries, whether
corporate or not, do not own property as natural persons, and
they were not exempted from taxation by article IX-A. '' 54 The
opinion provides no authority for this definition and no mention
of this issue can be obtained from a search of the two opinions
which the court was interpreting. The court simply overlooked
the legislative history which established that "individual" trust
beneficiaries were intended to be included in the benefits of
personal property tax relief. By holding as it did, the Illinois
Supreme Court succeeded in opening an entirely new problem.
"INDIVIDUAL" TRUST BENEFICIARIES AS "NON-rNDIVIDUALS"
The opinion of the court in Lake Shore II15 included a
dissent which raised the unfairness inherent in refusing to extend
the personal property tax relief to "individual" trust beneficiaries.5
The dissent noted that the majority holding would
operate to tax property of a decedent while held by the administrator or executor, but that such property would not be taxed
before the decedent's death or after its distribution to that
individual's heirs or legatees.5 7 Also, the dissent argued that
the majority opinion would serve to diminish the public's use
52. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 54 Ill. 2d 237, 296 N.E.2d
342 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as Lake Shore II].
53. Id. at 239, 296 N.E.2d at 343.
54. Id.
55. 54 Ill. 2d 237, 296 N.E.2d 342 (1973).
56. "As a result of this holding, personal property which would be
exempt from taxation if the legal ownership were vested in individuals
... would lose its exempt status if held by a fiduciary, individual or
corporate, while the beneficial ownership is vested in these same individ-

uals." Id. at 239, 296 N.E.2d at 343.

57. Id. at 240, 296 N.E.2d at 343.
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of trusts, especially those established under the Illinois Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act. 58 Whereas property held by an "individual" would be exempt from personal property taxation, if that
same property ever constituted the corpus of a trust or custodianship, it would be assessed and taxed. The character of the beneficiary in such a situation would not determine the taxability.
The solution suggested by the dissent was that "individual" beneficiaries are "natural persons" and are thereby exempt from personal property taxation. 59
Although the dissent argued that the majority opinion failed
to achieve the intent of the personal property exemption amendment, 60 it did not undertake an examination of the legislative
events which formed the basis of this conclusion. Such an
examination would have shown that the general legislative
intent was to exempt "individual" beneficiaries from personal
property taxation.
Illinois law provides that a proposed amendment to the state
constitution must be accompanied by an argument supporting the
provision and informing the voters of why it would be beneficial for them to approve the measure."' The same law also
authorizes a minority report. Accordingly, special legislative
committees representing both the majority and the minority
viewpoints were appointed and directed to prepare their respective arguments.
As originally drafted the minority's opposition argument
stated that "[personal property] owned by natural persons is
exempted from taxes; that . . . owned by corporations, trusts,

etc., is subject to taxes.""' 2 The final amended version of the
minority report, which was presented to and approved by the
General Assembly, was changed to read "[personal property]
owned by or held in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of
natural persons is exempted from taxes; that . . . owned by corporations, etc., is subject to taxes. '1 3 Every Illinois voter had the

opportunity to read and consider this argument before he voted,
so it is difficult to imagine that it was not the voter's intent
that "natural person" beneficiaries be excluded from the personal
property tax, as provided for in the minority argument. It seems
even more difficult to argue that it was not the legislature's
intent to exclude such beneficiaries from taxation. The majority
would not have acquiesced and allowed the minority report to
58. Id., 296 N.E.2d at 343-44.

59. Id., 296 N.E.2d at 344.
60. Id.
61. ILL. REv.

STAT.

ch. 7 %, § 2 (1973).

62. Ill. S. Jour., 76th Gen. Assembly, 1969 Sess., vol. II at 3537 (em-

phasis added).
63. Ill. S. Jour., 76th Gen. Assembly, 1970 Sess., vol. II at 4205.
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include a misstatement of the effect of the new constitutional
amendment.
Finally, Illinois officials responsible for collecting the personal property tax after the amendment's passage sought interpretative assistance to determine who was included in the
term "individuals."
In December of 1970 the Cook County
State's Attorney issued an opinion on the amendment which said
"that personal property held in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of natural persons shall not be subject to the personal property tax."6' 4 Shortly thereafter, the Illinois Attorney General
issued an opinion letter which stated that "since the effect of
the tax would be directly upon an individual beneficiary, such
' 65
personal property would be exempt.
Following passage of the amendment, it seemed that the
amendment's phrase "as to individuals" would exempt trust and
custodianship beneficiaries who were "natural persons."
It
appeared that the characterization of the trustee would have
no bearing on the imposition of the tax.
The majority opinion in Lake Shore II, however, raised the
issue of trusts and custodianships, and decided the issue in a
totally unexpected manner, but failed to provide any support for
its holding. While the dissent presented what had been the
anticipated result, it also failed to present the support which
existed for its position. This dual omission resulted in further
judicial action.
The Illinois Supreme Court was afforded the opportunity to
re-examine its treatment of trusts and custodianships in Hanley
v. Kusper.'6 By consolidating a beneficiary class action and an
action by a corporate trustee, the court was able to consider
nearly every conceivable type of trust and fiduciary relationship. 67 The court undertook an examination of the history of
the amendment to the 1870 Constitution, but emerged with a
holding identical to that of Lake Shore II. The court for the
second time "rejected the claim that all personal property held
in trust for natural persons is exempt from taxation."' 8 In a
result which can only be described as mystifying, however, the
court then found a legislative intent to exempt personal property
from taxation in "situations . . . in which the natural person
64. CooK CTY. ST's. AT'rY OP.,.No. 1340, Dec. 28, 1970.
65. ILL. ATT.GEN. Op. S-260, January 22, 1971.

66. 61 Ill.
2d 452, 337 N.E.2d 1-(1975).
67. In one of the two consolidated actions the court was asked to pass
upon "'all trusts, estates, guardianships, conservatorships or custodianships administered by plaintiff [bank] ... for the benefit of natural
persons.'" Id. at 456, 337 N.E.2d at 3.
68. Id. at 463, 337 N.E.2d at 7.
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[beneficiary] who owns the property is prevented by law from
dealing with it as a natural person."6 9
Thus, the court found a legislative intent to exempt personal
property from taxation where an "involuntary fiduciary relationship" is imposed upon a natural person. The court's interpretation thereby exempted three types of "involuntary fiduciary
relationships": 1) the period during which an estate is administered; 2) when an incompetent is assigned a conservator;
and 3) when a guardian or custodian is in charge of a minor's
property. The court's rationale was that in those enumerated
classes of natural persons, the particular persons were prevented
by law from exercising property rights available generally to
70
other natural persons.
The history of the amendment to the 1870 Constitution lacks
any legislative intent to separate various types of trust or fiduciary relationships. The court nevertheless claims that its holding is based on a "review of the interpretive materials," but the
court does not deny that it was persuaded by "underlying policy
considerations. ' 71 Since a review of the legislative materials
fails to uncover any instances where the legislature differentiated among various types of trust, custodial, or conservator
relationships, the opinion must be based solely upon those unspecified "policy considerations" in this area.
The court's opinion in Hanley suffers from serious omissions.
In the two years intervening between Lake Shore II and Hanley,
the legislature dealt with the unique problem created by trusts
in the context of the personal property tax. In 1974 the General
Assembly approved a bill which exempted all trustees from personal property taxation when the trust beneficiary is a natural
person. 72 The Governor of Illinois allowed the bill to become
law without his signature on September 7, 1974. He stated in
a message to the General Assembly that his intent in not signing the bill was to express to the Supreme Court the general
disapproval of the court's decision in Lake Shore II, which denied
' 73
an exemption when a trust beneficiary was a "natural person.
Although this Act exempting trustees from the personal
property tax when held for a natural person was enacted after
the passage of the amendment to the 1870 Constitution, the
69. Id., 337 N.E.2d at 7.
70. Id.
71. Id.

72. "All personal property held by a trustee, guardian, conservator,
executor, administrator or other fiduciary to the extent held for the exclusive benefit of a natural person" is exempt from the personal property
tax. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 500.21b (Smith-Hurd 1974).
73. ILL. S.B.A. NEWSLETTER, PROBATE AND TRUST, December, 1974, no.
2 at 1.
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legislature could not possibly have foreseen the trust issue.
Therefore, despite the passage of this Act after the amendment,
its represents the most valid expression of legislative intent. The
supreme court in Hanley, however, concluded "that [the Act]
contributes nothing of significance to a determination of the
meaning of the ambiguous phrase. ' 74 The failure of Hanley to
supply reasons for not relying on or discussing the Act clearly
establishes that the court most certainly relied on "policy considerations," rather than a review of the "interpretive materials."
The supreme court also summarily dismissed the legislature's
minority argument opposing the amendment. 75 The court's
basis for ignoring this direct source of legislative intent was the
fear that future minorities might intentionally insert language
in their arguments to frustrate the purpose of the General
Assembly and the voters.76 While in some circumstances the
court's fear could be justified, there were no facts surrounding
the attachment of the minority report to the amendment to
establish that the majority did not agree with the minority's
interpretation of the amendment's effect. Indeed, the very fact
that the minority report was corrected 77 could be taken to imply
that objections to the original interpretation were raised by
concerned members of the legislature.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Hanley represents the final resolution of the
interpretive problems inherent in the word "individuals" in the
amendment to the 1870 Constitution. Since the legislature chose
in 1974 to exempt from the personal property tax "[a] 11 personal
property held by a trustee, guardian, conservator, executor,
administrator or other fiduciary to the extent held for the exclusive benefit of a natural person,"7 8 the issue raised and decided
in Hanley will not arise again. The supreme court, therefore,
will not be able to correct its misinterpretation of legislative
intent, and the decision in Hanley will represent the state of the
law in Illinois prior to 1974. This situation raises a difficulty
which will arise if the legislature abolishes the personal property
79
tax in 1979.
When the personal property tax is abolished, the replacement
revenue must be derived solely from "those classes relieved of
the burden of the [personal property] tax because of the abolition
74. 61 Ill. 2d 452, 459, 337 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1975).
75. See text accompanying notes 62 and 63 supra.
76. 61 Ill. 2d 452, 460, 337 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1975).
77. See text accompanying notes 62 and 63 supra.
78. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 500.21b (Smith-Hurd 1974).
79. See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
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of such tax subsequent to January 2, 1971.80 The Hanley decision said that the only trust and fiduciary relationships exempted
under the amendment to the 1870 Constitution were those in
which the natural person is prevented by law from dealing with
his property. These relationships, therefore, are the only ones
which were effectively abolished before January 2, 1971, and are
the only ones which will be exempted from the replacement revenue tax. The net result of Hanley is that a trust, other than
those exempted in Hanley, would have been liable for the
personal property tax until 1974, exempt from the tax until the
personal property tax is abolished, and then liable for any tax
enacted to provide the replacement revenue.
The Hanley decision raises the additional question of
whether the amendment to the 1870 Constitution, as interpreted
in Hanley, has created equal protection considerations. The
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Lehnhausen
resolved the equal protection problem inherent in exempting
natural persons from a tax, but not exempting corporations. The
Supreme Court's decision did not, however, reach the problem
of exempting a natural person from a personal property tax for
property owned individually, and not exempting a natural
person's property when held for him by a trustee.
Richard 0. Wood

80. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 5(c) (1970).

